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Abstract
One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past
two decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed—not merely
revealed—in the process of elicitation. This conception is derived in part from studies
demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation often give rise to
systematically different responses. These "preference reversals" violate the principle of
procedure invariance fundamental to theories of rational choice and raise difficult questions
about the nature of human values. If different elicitation procedures produce different
orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist?
Describing and explaining such failures of invariance will require choice models of far
greater complexity than the traditional models.
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"The meaning of preference and the status of value may be illuminated by the well-known
exchange among three baseball umpires. T call them as I see them,' said the first. T call
them as they are,' claimed the second. The third disagreed, 'They ain't nothing till I call
them.' Analogously, we can describe three different views regarding the nature of values.
First, values exist—like body temperature—and people perceive and report them as best they
can, possibly with bias (I call them as I see them). Second, people know their values and
preferences directly—as they know the multiplication table (I call them as they are). Third,
values or preferences are commonly constructed in the process of elicitation (they ain't
nothing till I call them). The research reviewed in this article is most compatible with the
third view of preference as a constructive, context-dependent process."
—Tversky & Thaler (1990, p. 210)
Introduction
The expression of preference by means of choice and decision making is the essence
of intelligent, purposeful behavior. Although decision making has been studied for centuries
by philosophers, mathematicians, economists, and statisticians, it has a relatively short
history within psychology. The first extensive review of the theory of decision making was
published in the Psychological Bulletin by Edwards (1954). This paper introduced
psychologists to the'"exceedingly elaborate, mathematical and voluminous" (p. 380)
economic literature on choice and reviewed the handful of relevant experimental studies then
in existence.
Edward's review was followed by a rapid proliferation of theories of choice and
decision making, along with carefully controlled experiments designed to test these theories.
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This work followed two parallel streams. One, the theory of riskless choice, had its origins
in the notions of utility maximization put forth by Jeremy Bentham and James Mill. The first
formal economic theories based on these notions assumed that decision makers are (1)
completely informed about the possible courses of action and their consequences, (2)
infinitely sensitive to differences in alternatives, and (3) rational in the sense that they can
rank order the possible choices and make decisions so as to maximize some subjective
measure of value or welfare—usually designated by the term utility.
The second stream, the theory of risky choice, deals with decisions made in the face
of uncertainty about the events that will determine the outcomes of one's actions.
Maximization also plays a key role in these theories, but the quantity to be maximized
becomes, due to the uncertainty involved, expected utility. Tests of the theory that
individuals behave so as to maximize expected utility have been the topic of hundreds of
experiments, many of which studied reactions to well-defined manipulations of simple
gambles as their basic research paradigm.
A basic assumption of rational theories of choice is the principle of invariance
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1986; Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988) which states that the
relation of preference should not depend on the description of the options (description
invariance) or-on the method-of elicitation (procedure invariance). Without stability across
equivalent descriptions and equivalent elicitation procedures, one's preferences cannot be
represented as maximization of utility.
Between 1950 and 1960 another development was taking place that was to have a
profound influence on the study of decision making. This was the work of Simon (1956),
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who sharply criticized the assumption of maximization in utility theory. Simon argued that
actual decision-making behavior is better described in terms of bounded rationality. A
boundedly rational decision maker attempts to attain some satisfactory, though not necessarily
maximal, level of achievement. Simon's conceptualization highlighted the role of perception,
cognition, and learning in decision making and directed researchers to examine the
psychological processes by which decision problems are represented and information is
processed.
In recent years the information-processing view has dominated the empirical study of
decision making. Both streams of research, on risky and riskless choice, have been merged
in a torrent of studies aimed at describing and understanding the mental operations associated
with judgment and decision making. The result has been a far more complicated portrayal of
decision making than that provided by utility maximization theory. It is now generally
recognized among psychologists that utility maximization provides only limited insight into
the processes by which decisions are made.
In particular, a sizable body of research shows that description invariance and
procedure invariance do not hold. Preferences appear to be remarkably labile, sensitive to the
way in which a choice problem is described or "framed" and to the mode of response by
which the preference is expressed-(Fischhoff, Slovic,. & Lichtenstein, 1980; Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). These failures of invariance have contributed
to a new conception of judgment and choice in which beliefs and preferences are often
constructed—not merely revealed—in the elicitation process.
Psychologists' claims that people do not behave according to the dictates of utility
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theory are particularly-troubling to economists, whose theories-assume that people are
rational in the sense of having preferences that are complete and transitive1 and in the sense
of choosing what they most prefer.
The present paper reviews the history of research on preference reversals, a line of
information-processing theories and experiments that has demonstrated the failure of
procedure invariance and contributed to a view of preference starkly different from the view
embodied in economic theories of choice.
Preference Reversals Among Gambles: Early Studies
The principle of procedure invariance is violated by "preference reversals" induced
by changing from one mode of eliciting a preference to another, formally equivalent, mode
of response.
An early demonstration of response-mode effects by Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968)
used simple gambles as stimuli (for instance, .3 chance to win $16 and .7 chance to lose $4).
Slovic and Lichtenstein observed that ratings of a gamble's attractiveness and choices
between pairs of gambles were influenced primarily by the probabilities of winning and
losing, whereas buying and selling prices (for instance, "What's the most you would pay for
a chance to play this gamble?" or "What's the least amount for which you would sell a ticket
to play it-?") were primarily determined by the dollar amounts that could be won or lost.
When participants found a bet attractive, their prices correlated predominantly with the
amount to win; when they disliked a bet, their prices correlated primarily with the amount
that could be lost. This pattern of correlations was explained as the result of a starting point
(anchoring) and adjustment procedure used when setting prices. Respondents setting a price
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on an attractive gamble appeared to start with the amount to win and adjust it downward to
take into account the probabilities of winning and losing, and the amount that could be lost.
The adjustment process is relatively imprecise, leaving the price response greatly influenced
by the starting point payoff. Ratings and choices, on the other hand, appeared to be governed
by different rules, leading to greater emphasis on probabilities.
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) hypothesized that, if people process information
differently when making choices and setting prices, it should be possible to construct pairs of
gambles such that a person would choose one member of the pair but set a higher price on
the other. They demonstrated this predicted effect in several studies, including one conducted
on the floor of the Four Queens Casino in Las Vegas (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1973). A
typical pair of gambles in that study (shown below) consisted of one bet with a high
probability to win a modest amount (called the P bet) and one bet with a lower probability of
winning a larger payoff (called the $ bet):
P bet: 11/12 chance to win 12 chips
1/12 chance to lose 24 chips
$ bet: 2/12 chance to win 79 chips
10/12 chance to lose 5 chips,
where each-chip-was worth 25 cents. Each subject first made a choice and later indicated a
minimum selling price for each bet. For this pair of gambles, the two bets were chosen about
equally often, across respondents. However, the $ bet received a higher selling price about
88% of the time. Of the participants who chose the P bet, 87% gave a higher selling price to
the $ bet. This is no minor inconsistency. Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) showed that persons
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who persisted in this pattern of preferences (and some did) could be turned into a "money
pumps," continuously giving money to the experimenters without ever playing the gambles.
These early studies captured the attention of a few psychologists and other decision
researchers, who replicated and extended the findings. Economists were introduced to the
preference reversal phenomenon by David Grether and Charles Plott (1979), who clearly
recognized the threat this phenomenon posed to economic theories of choice: "The
inconsistency is deeper than the mere lack of transitivity.... It suggests that no optimization
principles of any sort lie behind even the simplest of human choices..." (p. 623).
Accordingly, they carried out a series of experiments "designed to discredit the
psychologists' works as applied to economics" (p. 623). Their design was based on thirteen
criticisms and potential artifacts that would render preference reversals irrelevant to
economic theory, including the fact that the experimenters were psychologists, which might
have led the participants to behave peculiarly. Their manipulations included using special
incentives to heighten motivation, controlling for income and order effects, allowing
indifference in the choice responses, testing the influence of strategic or bargaining biases,
and having economists conduct the study. To their surprise, preference reversals remained
much in evidence despite their determined effort to eradicate them.
*- •- •••-•'- Grether and Plott-'s careful experiment seemed only to motivate more extreme
attempts by economists to make preference reversals disappear. Pommerehne, Schneider, and
Zweifel (1982) attempted to increase motivation by raising the face value of the payoffs and
creating differences in expected value between the P and $ bets in a pair. They, too, found a
substantial proportion of reversals, leading them to conclude: "Even when the subjects are
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exposed to strong incentives for making motivated, rational decisions, the phenomenon of
preference reversal does not vanish" (p. 573).
Reilly (1982) was also skeptical of the adequacy of Grether and Plott's controls. To
maximize respondents' understanding of the task, he conducted a study in which the money
at risk was placed on a desk in front of the subject and the size of potential losses in the
gambles was increased to enhance motivation. Although the rate of preference reversals was
somewhat lower than that observed by Grether and Plott, the phenomenon persisted to a
substantial extent. Reilly conceded that these results provided "further confirmation of
preference reversal as a persistent behavioral phenomenon in situations where economic
theory is generally applied" (p. 582). Nevertheless, he maintained the hope that further
strengthening of monetary incentives and provision of additional information to the
participants would make this troublesome phenomenon disappear, thus salvaging preference
theory.
Preference reversals were also observed by Knez and Smith (1986), who allowed their
participants to trade bets in an experimental market, and by Berg, Dickhaut, and O'Brien
(1985), who employed an arbitrage procedure that turned participants whose prices and
preferences were inconsistent into "money pumps." Chu and Chu (1990) and Cox and
Grether-(1994). were finally able to eradicate preference reversals in market settings
characterized by repetition, feedback, and harsh penalties for being inconsistent.
Some economists have attempted to save utility theory by arguing that preference
reversals can be accommodated by doing away with less central axioms rather than by
abandoning transitivity (see, e.g., Holt, 1986; Karni & Safra, 1987). Other theorists,
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however, proposed more radical departures from utility theory. Both Loomes and Sugden
(1983) and Fishburn (1985) designed theories that abandoned the requirement of transitivity.
Slovic and Lichtenstein (1983) responded to economists' repeated attacks and
defensive posture by attempting to show how preference reversals fit into a larger picture of
framing and information processing effects that, as a whole, pose a collective challenge to
preference theories far exceeding that from reversals alone. They urged economists not to
resist these developments but, instead, to examine them for insights into ways that decisions
are made and the ways that the practice of decision making can be improved.
Hausman (1991) was also critical of economists' refusal to take preference reversals
seriously. Writing on "Dogmatism in Economics," he traced economists' reactions to their
reluctance to abandon a single systematic and parsimonious theory of choice that is also a
theory of rational choice in favor of psychologists' narrower and more complex theories.
Nevertheless, he concluded, economists' reactions were hard to defend, creating
"unreasonable barriers to theoretical and empirical progress" (p. 223).
The Causes of Preference Reversals
Although the early studies established the robustness of the preference reversal
phenomenon, its interpretation and explanation remained unclear, leading to a second wave
of studies'starting-in the mid-1980s.
Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman (1990) formulated the explanatory problem as
follows. First, they defined a preference reversal as the following combination of responses:
H > L and CL > CH
Where H refers to the high probability gamble (earlier called the P bet), L refers to the low
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probability gamble (the $ bet); CH and CL denote, respectively, the cash equivalent (or
minimum selling price) of H and L; and >- and ~ denote strict preference and indifference,
respectively. Note that > refers to the ordering of cash amounts and X > Y implies X >- Y;
more money is preferred to less.
A preference reversal can be shown to imply either the intransitivity of the preference
relation > or the failure of procedure invariance, or both.
If procedure invariance holds, an individual will be indifferent between his or her
stated price (cash equivalent) X and the bet B; that is,
B > X iff CB > X and
CB = X iff B « X.
Therefore, if invariance holds, preference reversal implies the following intransitive cycle:
CH « H > L « CL > CH
Where the two inequalities follow from the preference reversal, and the two equivalences
follow from procedure invariance.
But two types of discrepancies between choice and pricing (i.e., failures of
invariance) could also produce preference reversals: overpricing of L and underpricing of H.
Overpricing of L is said to occur if the decision maker prefers the price over the bet when
offered a choice'between them (i.e., CL > L). Underpricing of H occurs when'H > CH.
Overpricing and underpricing merely identify the sign of the discrepancy between pricing and
choice; the labels do not imply that choice represents one's "true" preference and the bias
resides only in pricing.
Tversky et al. (1990) developed a procedure for diagnosing whether any observed
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preference reversal was due to intransitivity, overpricing of L, underpricing of H, or both
overpricing of L and underpricing of H, and they used this procedure in a new study.2 The
results were clear. The experiment yielded the usual rate of preference reversal (between 40
and 50%), but only 10% of preference reversal patterns were intransitive, and the remaining
90% violated procedure invariance. By far the major source of preference reversal was the
overpricing of the L bet, which accounted for nearly two-thirds of the observed patterns.
These conclusions were further supported in a study by Bostic, Herrnstein, and Luce (1990)
who used a somewhat different methodology.
The Compatibility Hypothesis
In the earliest studies on preference reversals, two information-processing concepts
were proposed to account for the dependence on payoff cues in pricing a gamble. These were
starting point and adjustment strategies (e.g., starting with the amount to win and adjusting it
downward) and the concept of compatibility. Lichtenstein and Slovic (1973) proposed a
"general hypothesis that the compatibility or commensurability between a cue dimension and
the required response will affect the importance of the cue in determining the response" (p.
20).
The finding by Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman (1990) that preference reversals were
due primarily to overpricing the high payoff bets led to a reexamination and more precise
formulation of the compatibility hypothesis by them and by Slovic, Griffin, and Tversky
(1990). Slovic etal. proposed that the weight of a stimulus attribute in judgment or in choice
is enhanced by its compatibility with the response mode.3 The rationale for this scale
compatibility hypothesis is two-fold. First, if the stimulus scale and the response scale do not
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match, additional mental operations are needed to-map the former onto the latter. This
increases effort and error and may reduce the impact of the stimulus scale. Second, a
response mode tends to focus attention on the compatible features of the stimulus.
The hypothesized link between compatibility and preference reversals was supported
in a number of new studies reported by Slovic, Griffin, and Tversky (1990). In one of these
studies, participants were presented with six pairs of H and L bets. Three pairs involved
monetary payoffs as in Study 1, and three pairs involved nonmonetary outcomes, such as a
1-week pass for all movie theater in town, or a dinner for two at a good restaurant. If
preference reversals are due primarily to the compatibility of prices and payoffs, which are
both expressed in dollars, their incidence should be substantially reduced by the use of
nonmonetary outcomes. This prediction was confirmed; the overall incidence of reversals
decreased from 41% (monetary bets) to 24% (nonmonetary bets).
Although the compatibility hypothesis can explain preference reversals between pairs
of bets, the explanation does not depend on the presence of risk. Indeed, this hypothesis
implies a similar discrepancy between choice and pricing for riskless options with a monetary
component, such as delayed payments. Let (X, T) be a prospect that offers a payment of $X,
T years from now. Consider a long-term prospect L ($2500, 5 years from now) and a short-
term prospect S ($1600, 1.5 years from now). Suppose that respondents (1) choose between
L and S and (2) price both prospects by stating the smallest immediate cash payment for
which they would be willing to exchange the delayed payment. According to the
compatibility hypothesis, the monetary component X would weigh more heavily in pricing
than in choice. As a consequence, respondents should produce preference reversals in which
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the short-term option is preferred over the long-term option in a direct choice, but the latter
is priced higher than the former (i.e., S >- L and CL > Cs). This was precisely the pattern
observed by Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman (1990). Their participants chose the short-term
option 74% of the time but priced the long-term option above the short-term option 75% of
the time; the rate of reversals exceeded 50%. Further analysis revealed that—as in the risky
case—the major source of preference reversal was the overpricing of the long-term option, as
entailed by compatibility.
Additional support for the role of compatibility in preference reversals came from a
study by Schkade and Johnson (1989). This study used "mouselab," a computer-based
method for monitoring the time spent by each subject looking at probabilities and at payoffs
as they priced bets, rated their attractiveness, or made choices. They found that the
percentage of time spent on payoffs was significantly greater in pricing than in choice when
respondents produced preference reversals, but there was little difference when respondents
did not exhibit reversals. A second experiment produced a high percentage of reversals
between pricing responses and attractiveness ratings, along with strong evidence
demonstrating the use of anchoring and adjustment strategies. The selection of anchors (e.g.,
payoffs for pricing and probabilities for rating) appeared to be guided by compatibility.
..".., ^Goldstein and. Einhorn (1987) had also found reversals between pricing and
attractiveness ratings and had attributed them to the way in which the subjective value of a
gamble was mapped onto the response scale. Although their model can accommodate
reversals of preference, it does not predict the variety of compatibility effects that other
studies have observed.
The Construction of Preference 15
Choice, Matching, and the Prominence Effect
In parallel with the early work on preference reversals, what appeared at the time to
be a separate line of research was investigating the difference between choice and matching
responses, using a diverse array of two-dimensional stimuli such as baseball players
described in terms of their batting averages and number of home runs, typists described by
their speed and accuracy, and so forth. The results, reported in Slovic (1975), were framed
in terms of the ancient philosophical puzzle of how to choose between equally attractive
alternatives. In these studies, participants first matched different pairs of options (making
them equal in value), and, in a later session, chose between the matched options. Slovic
found that participants did not choose randomly, but rather tended to select the option that
was superior on the more important dimension (e.g., batting average; typing quality). About
a decade later, Amos Tversky saw in this finding the seeds of a general theory of response-
mode effects that had the potential to explain a wide variety of empirical findings including
preference reversals. This theory was explicated and tested by Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic
(1988).
Tversky et al. (1988) noted that choice and matching operations were fundamental to
measurement in both the physical and the social sciences. To determine the heavier of two
objects,' for example; -we can place them on two sides of a pan balance-and observe which
side goes down. Alternatively, we can place each object separately on a sliding scale and
observe the position at which the sliding scale is balanced. Similarly, to determine the
preference order between options we can use either choice or matching (where matching
includes rating scales, cash equivalents, etc.). Note that the pan balance is analogous to
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binary choice, whereas the sliding scale resembles matching. In proper physical
measurement, procedure invariance holds: The ordering of two objects with regard to weight
is identical with either the pan balance or the sliding scale. However, as we have seen,
choice and matching often disagree when used to measure preferences.
Generalizing from the results of Slovic (1975), Tversky et al. (1988) formulated the
prominence hypothesis: The more prominent (important) attribute will weigh more heavily in
choice than in matching. This hypothesis was tested and supported using a series of problems
such as the highway safety problem shown in Table 1. Number of casualties was presumed to
be the prominent dimension in this problem. When asked to choose between the two safety
programs, 67% of the respondents chose X, the program that saved more lives at a higher
cost per life saved. Other groups of respondents received the same problem except that one
of the four values was missing. They were asked to fill in the missing value to make the two
programs equally attractive. It is possible to infer a person's response to the choice task from
their response to the matching task. For example, if the cost for program X was missing and
the subject filled in a value less than $55 million to make the two programs equally
attractive, one would infer that this person would choose Y over X when the cost for X was
$55 million. In fact, the overwhelming number of matches favored the more economical
program-Y that saves fewer lives. Only 4% of the inferred choices favored program X.
Similar responses were observed across a variety of other problems. In every case, the
primary dimension was given more weight in choice than in matching. This effect gives rise
to a marked discrepancy between the preferences derived from choice and matching, thus
violating procedure invariance. Because pricing a gamble or judging its "cash equivalent" is
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a matching response, one can view preference reversals among bets as a special case of the
choice-matching discrepancy in which probability of winning is the prominent dimension that
gets greater weight in choice.4
Insert Table 1 about here
Tversky et al. (1988) suggested that different heuristics or computational schemes
appear to be used in the two kinds of tasks. Choice invokes more qualitative reasoning such
as the use of a lexicographic strategy (i.e., select the alternative that is ordinally superior on
the most important attribute). Lexicographic reasoning is cognitively easier than making
explicit tradeoffs and is also easier to justify to oneself and others. Matching, on the other
hand, requires a more quantitative assessment. Tversky et al. proposed that ordinal
considerations loom larger in the ordinal procedure of choice than in the cardinal procedure
of matching. The prominence effect may thus be seen as an example of a general principle
that Fischer and Hawkins (1993) later labeled "strategy compatibility."
Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic (1988) also developed a hierarchy of contingent tradeoff
models to accommodate the various compatibility effects observed in studies of judgment and
preference. In these models, the tradeoffs between attributes depend on the nature of the
response-- _
Reliance on the prominent dimension makes a good reason for choice. Demonstration
of the prominence effect thus focused attention on the importance of reasons, arguments, and
justifications in choice. In earlier work, the search for good reasons to eliminate options
from consideration had been shown to guide the choice strategies observed and modeled by
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Tversky (1969). Slovic (1975) also evoked justifiability to explain people's preferences for
the option that was superior on the prominent dimension when faced with a choice among
equally valued alternatives. Montgomery (1983) argued that people search for and construct
dominance structures5 in decision problems because they provide a compelling reason for
choice. The axioms of utility theory may act as compelling arguments or reasons for making
a particular decision when their applicability is detected or pointed out (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1986).
Additional evidence for a reason-based conception of choice is provided by Tversky
and Simonson (1993) and Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky (1993). Shafir et al. argue that a
reason-based conception fits well with a constructive interpretation of choice. Different
frames, contexts, and elicitation procedures highlight different aspects of the options and
bring forth different reasons and considerations that influence the decision.
The Construction of Preference
The study of preference reversals has been one of several lines of research leading to
a conception of choice quite different from the classical assumption that the decision maker
has a complete preference order for all options and selects the option highest in that order.
This new conception applies to judgments and choices among options that are important,
complex,-and perhaps unfamiliar, such as gambles, jobs, careers, homes, automobiles,
surgical treatments, and environments. In these decisions, preferences are not simply read off
some "master list" but are constructed on the spot by an "adaptive decision maker" (Payne,
Bettman, & Johnson, 1992, 1993). Construction strategies include anchoring and adjustment,
relying on the prominent dimension, eliminating common elements, discarding nonessential
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differences, adding new attributes into the problem frame in order to bolster one alternative,
or otherwise restructuring the decision problem to create dominance and thus reduce conflict
and indecision. As a result of these mental gymnastics, decision making is a highly
contingent form of information processing, sensitive to task complexity, time pressure,
response mode, framing, reference points, and numerous other contextual factors.
Krantz (1991) portrays this new conception of decision making as attempting to solve
several distinct problems in the absence of firm tradeoffs or values. He challenges the
normative status of utility theory as well as its descriptive status:
The normative assumption that individuals should maximize some quantity may be
wrong. Perhaps...there exists nothing to be maximized. Ordering may be
partial...because the calculations are impossible in principle: People do and should act
as problem solvers, not maximizers, because they have many different and
incommensurable...goals to achieve." (p. 34)
Practical Implications of Preference Construction
The study of preference aims not only to understand decision making but to improve
it. The constructive view has much to offer in this regard. For as Delquie (1993) has
observed, prescriptive decision analysis is basically about constructing preferences in
situations where-the right choice is not readily apparent. The analysis requires a process that
is transparent, logical, and free of arbitrariness. Truth ultimately resides in the process,
rather than in the outcome.
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Valuing the Environment . ..
One practical application of preference construction addresses the method of
contingent valuation (CV), which has been used by economists for more than 25 years to
value environmental actions such as wetlands protection, water and air quality improvements,
and wildlife resources. The CV method posits a hypothetical market and asks people to
imagine what they would pay in this market for a proposed change in the environmental state
of interest: However, valuing environmental changes is exactly the kind of complex,
unfamiliar task where one would not expect to find stable, well-articulated preferences,
making it a likely candidate for constructive processes. Irwin, Slovic, Lichtenstein, and
McClelland (1993) used knowledge of constructive preferences to examine and critique the
CV approach. They developed a preference reversal experiment in which subjects were asked
to choose between improved air quality and an upgraded computer and to indicate their cash
equivalents for each improvement. Irwin et al. found, as predicted by the prominence
hypothesis, that participants would chose improved air quality as more valuable, presumably
because choice invokes reasons and there are stronger, more noble reasons for preferring air
quality over a computer upgrade. They also predicted, and found, that people would place a
higher monetary value on the computer upgrade, presumably because of the strong implicit
price .cues associated with a better computer. Preference reversals (preference for improved
air quality in choice and the computer upgrade in pricing) were observed in 41% of the
respondents.
Kahneman and Ritov (1994) also hypothesized and found prominence effects leading
to reversals between choices and monetary values for environmental interventions, though the
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specific nature of these effects was somewhat different from that observed by Irwin et al.
With the findings of Irwin et al. in mind, Gregory, Lichtenstein, and Slovic (1993)
launched a critique of the CV paradigm. They argued that if monetary values are constructed
during the elicitation process in a way that is strongly influenced by context, one should take
a deliberate approach to value construction in a manner designed to rationalize the process.
They recommended the use of multi-attribute utility theory (von Winterfeldt & Edwards,
1986), which provides a systematic framework for eliciting and integrating the multiple
dimensions of complex values. In this way, the CV survey would serve as an active process
of value construction, rather than a neutral process of value discovery, and the designers of a
CV study would function "not as archaeologists, carefully uncovering what is there, but as
architects, working to build a defensible expression of value" (Gregory, Lichtenstein, &
Slovic, 1993, p. 179).
Informed Consent
The role of preference construction as an active process was perceived in a very
different way by MacLean (1991), a philosopher interested in informed consent in clinical
medicine. MacLean describes the move away from the traditional model whereby authority is
"delegated" by the patient to the physician toward a new model of "shared decision making"
in which enlightened physicians give primary responsibility to the patient. The physician thus
acts as an expert advisor, providing information and counseling. The shared decision-making
model thus respects the patient's autonomy in the face of decisions that are difficult and
momentous. It also protects the physician against the charge of imposing an unwanted
treatment on the patient.
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MacLean argues that if preferences are constructed in the process of informing,
framing the options, and eliciting the response, the rationale behind the shared model of
consent cannot be defended. Rather, this model makes the physician's role more difficult and
risky. He or she is helping to construct preferences, and this should be done consciously yet
in a way that avoids domination. MacLean offers no simple guidelines for the physician but
argues that the process must be more involved and interactive than the normal approach if
the value of informed consent is to be realized.
Preference Management
The fact that preferences are highly labile, which psychologists have worked so hard
to demonstrate, has been known to practical philosophers for ages. If preferences are so
readily manipulable, why not manage them for one's own benefit. For example, we can
choose our goals and aspiration levels. Thus, the Talmud asks, "Who is it that is rich?" and
answers, "One who is content with his portion."6 We are advised by those wiser than
ourselves to "put things in perspective," by comparing our misfortunes with far worse
troubles or by considering how unimportant some present problem will seem 10 years from
now.
The constructive theory may help us do a better job of managing our preferences.
Thus MacLean's patients and physicians might be advised to sift and weigh alternative
reasons or justifications, working to develop a rationale for action. A strong rationale might
buffer the patient from regret and make it easier to accept the consequences of the decision.
If the patient is an intuitive decision theorist, this process could invoke utility functions and
maximization rules. However, quite different justifications could be equally legitimate if they
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have been thoughtfully derived.
An appreciation of framing effects could also help us manage our preferences more
effectively (Thaler, 1985). Suppose, for example, that a person with $5,600 in a bank
account misplaces a $100 bill. Rather than isolating and dwelling on this painful loss,
assimilating it into one's total account may ease the sting by exploiting the perception that
$5,500 is not that different from $5,600.
The concepts of preference construction and preference management reflect the deep
interplay between descriptive phenomena and normative principles. Experimental study of
decision processes appears to be forging a new conception of preference, one that may
require serious restructuring of normative theories and approaches toward improving decision
making.
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and who made the conduct of my own research in this area a truly pleasurable and exciting
venture.
The Construction of Preference 30
Footnotes ..
1. A person's preferences are complete if, for all options x and y, she prefers x
to y or y to x or is indifferent between them. Her preferences are transitive if, for all
options x, y, and z, if she prefers x to y and y to z, then she prefers x to z.
Completeness and transitivity are fundamental to utility theories.
2. In this diagnostic procedure, the original preference reversal design was
extended to include, in addition to the standard H and L bets, a cash amount X that was
compared to both of them. That is, participants indicated their preferences between each
of the pairs in the triple {H, L, X}. Participants also produced cash equivalents, CL and
CH, for both of the bets. By focusing on standard preference reversal patterns in which
the prespecified cash amount X has been set to lie between the values of CL and CH
generated by this subject (i.e., H > L and CL > X > CH), it is possible to diagnose
each preference reversal pattern according to whether it was produced by an
intransitivity, by an overpricing of L, by an underpricing of H, or by both. For
example, if respondents indicated that L >- X, and that X >- H, then their preferences are
intransitive because the method analyzes only those cases in which H > L. Alternatively,
if respondents overprice the L bet, then their pattern of responses will be X > L and X
> H. (The respondents produce a price for L that is greater than X, but when offered a
choice between X and L, they choose X.) This pattern is transitive, though it is a
preference reversal.
3. The significance of the compatibility between input and output has long been
recognized by students of human performance. Engineering psychologists have
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discovered that responses to visual displays of information, such as an instrument panel,
will be faster and more accurate if the response structure is compatible with the
arrangement of the stimuli (Fitts & Seeger, 1953). For example, the response to a pair
of lights will be faster and more accurate if the left light is assigned to the left key and
the right light to the right key. Similarly, a square array of four burners on a stove is
easier to control with a matching square array of knobs than with a linear array.
4. A nice example of prominence is the finding that personal safety looms larger in
choices between options that vary in both safety and cost than in the pricing of such
options (Magat, Viscusi, & Huber, 1988). Safety is more prominent than money, and
thus is given greater weight in choice than in pricing.
5. A dominance structure is a choice situation in which one option is as good or
better than another on all relevant aspects.
6. Not being a Talmudic scholar, I am indebted to David Krantz (1991) for this
example.
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Table 1
Highway Safety Problem Used to Assess the Prominence Effect
Q: About 600 people are killed each year in Israel in traffic accidents. The ministry of
transportation investigates various programs to reduce the number of casualties.
Consider the following two programs, described in terms of yearly costs (in
millions of dollars) and the number of casualties per year that is expected following
the implementation of each program. Which program do you favor?
Expected number of
casualties Cost
Program X 500 $55M [67%]
Program Y 570 $12M [33%]
Source: Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic (1988).
